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THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS HAVE A "SPECIAL NEED"
FOR THEIR STUDENTS' URINE
Irene Merker Rosenberg*
Prior to my teaching career, I was an attorney for the Juvenile
Rights Division of the Legal Aid Society in New York City-a snarly
metropolis that has the best and the worst, of everything. I represented
children who lived in bombed out sections of the Bronx who were
alleged to be delinquent, in need of supervision, or neglected-that is,
children charged with murder, rape, robbery, truancy, running away
from home and those beaten beyond recognition by their parents. I have
never recovered from that grisly encounter with law in the real world.
For over twenty-five years I have been writing' and teaching about
children in various legal contexts. My main focus has been on the
* Royce R. Till Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. B.A. 1961, C.C.N.Y.;
LL.B. New York University School of Law. I wish to thank Harriet Richman, Faculty Services
Librarian, University of Houston Law Library for her research assistance. My thanks also to the
University of Houston Law Foundation for its financial support. I dedicate this Article to my late
husband, Yale L. Rosenberg.
1. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L. and the Fourth Amendment Rights of Juvenile Delinquents:
Peekaboo!, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 289 (2000); Teen Violence and the Juvenile Courts: A Plea for
Reflection and Restraint, 37 Hous. L. REV. 75 (2000); The Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment,
and the Public Schools: An Ominous Mixture, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 360 (2000); Public School Drug
Testing: The Impact of Acton, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 349 (1995); A Door Left Open: Applicability
of the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule to Juvenile Court Delinquency Hearings, 24 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 29 (1996); Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists,
1993 Wis. L. REV. 163 (1993); Bouknight: Of Abused Children and the Parental Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 76 IOWA L. REV. 535 (1991); Winship Redux: 1970 to 1990, 69 TEX. L. REV.
109 (1990); A Study in Irrationality: Refusal to Grant Substantive Due Process Protection Against
Excessive Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 399 (1990); New Jersey v.
T.L.O.: Of Children and Smokescreens, 19 FAM. L.Q. 311 (1985); Schall v. Martin: A Child is a
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juvenile courts and the public schools, and I have been critical of both
institutions-in my opinion, deservedly. In this Article I want to share
my concerns about the drive for drug testing in the public schools, and
the dangers of the "special needs" doctrine that facilitates reduced
Fourth Amendment protection for students (and for certain classes of
adults). To that end I analyze the Supreme Court cases dealing with
searches of public school children-New Jersey v. TL.O.,2 Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton,3 and Board of Education v. Earls.4 I
conclude that the Court's analyses in these cases seriously erode the
Fourth Amendment, an explicit fundamental constitutional right, and
treats school drug testing policies, that impinge on bodily privacy, with
the same degree of deference given to economic governmental
regulations or laws that receive low level rational relationship scrutiny, a
scrutiny that is "toothless."5
In New Jersey v. T.L. O.,6 the Court ruled that although public
school officials were state actors for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment,7 neither a warrant nor probable cause was required to
permit searches-not just frisks-of students. s The standard for school
searches of public school students was a mushy "reasonableness, under
all the circumstances." 9 The searches authorized by T.L.O. could be
conducted for evidence of either criminal wrongdoing or violation of
school rules."0 The principal who searched the student's purse in T.L.O.
Child is a Child, 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 253 (1984); Juvenile Status Offender Statutes-New
Perspectives on an Old Problem, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283 (1983); The ConstitutionalRights of
Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not so Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV.
656 (1980); Ingraham v. Wright: The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 75
(1978); The Legacy of the Stubborn and Rebellious Son, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1097 (1976) (co-author
Yale L. Rosenberg).
2. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
3. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
4. 122 S.Ct. 2559 (2002).
5. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1972) (describing old equal
protection analysis by the Court).
6. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
7. See id. at 333. Prior to T.L.O., many jurisdictions had concluded that public school
teachers were not state actors for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because they acted in loco
parentis. See, e.g., D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252, 260 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (finding that teachers
searching students for evidence of crime did so merely as an incident to their employment rather
than as a police official whose job it was to discover evidence of criminal activity); In re R.C.M.,
660 S.W.2d 552, 553-54 (Tex. App. 1983) (concluding that school officials, including a security
guard, were acting in loco parentis when searching a student).
8. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41.
9. Id. at 341.
10. See id. at 371 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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had reasonable suspicion for doing so, but in a footnote the Court made
clear that it was not deciding whether the Fourth Amendment required
such a particularized belief in the school context." Indeed, the majority
left open many Fourth Amendment issues, including the standard for
police searches of students'2 and whether the exclusionary rule applies to
the fruits of school searches.'3
The reduced standard for searches in public schools was made
possible because the Court concluded that public schools presented
"special needs" beyond that of law enforcement.'4 This view regarding
"special needs" is in accord with other decisions of the Court limiting
the First," Eighth,' 6 and Fourteenth Amendments in the public schools,"
as well as Court rulings restricting constitutional protection for minors in
other contexts.'8
The special needs doctrine was initially recognized as an
exceptional basis for deviating from the normal protections of the Fourth
Amendment.' 9 The theory was that government should not be held to
such a strict standard when its goal was not to further criminal law
11. See id. at 342 n.8.
12. See id. at 341 n.7. Apparently the standard for police frisks of juveniles outside school
premises is the same as for adults-reasonable suspicion. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269
(2000) (reversing conviction of youth upon whom a gun was found when frisked by the police,
because the information lacked the indicia of reliability).
13. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333 n.3.
14. See id. at 332 n.2.
15. See Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 507-09, 515 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(affirming First Amendment right of public school students to wear black armbands as a political
protest, but specifically noting that such a constitutional right would not be coextensive with those
of adults because of the school environment).
16. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (finding that severe corporal
.
punishment of public school students did not violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of
the Eighth Amendment because that prohibition only applied in criminal contexts, not to schools).
17. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (requiring minimal due process hearing for
students suspended from school for less than ten days); Ingraham,430 U.S. at 682 (holding that due
process does not require a hearing prior to infliction of severe corporal punishment by school
officials).
18. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (upholding vague preventive
detention statute for youths alleged to be delinquent, noting that children only possess a truncated
liberty interest because they are always in some form of custody); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604
(1979) (holding constitutional a statute giving parents the right to commit their children to state
mental hospitals without a formal due process commitment hearing); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (using a reduced significant state interest test to determine
abortion rights of minors rather than the more rigorous compelling state interest test used for adult
women); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion) (refusing to
extend Sixth Amendment right to jury trial to alleged delinquents being tried in juvenile court).
19. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-40 (1967) (upholding area warrants
for inspection of possible housing, fire and health violations, if there were standards for conducting
such area inspections).
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enforcement, and where the warrant and probable cause requirements
would impede the government's pursuit of substantial non-criminal
objectives. 0 Of course, if any evidence of criminal wrongdoing were
uncovered during the government's actions regarding its non-criminal
goals, the evidence would be admissible in a criminal trial even though it
was obtained without a warrant or probable cause.2' The government was
acting legally and therefore evidence it discovered during such searches
was untainted. But as the old adage goes, give them an inch and they'll
take a mile-maybe two or three. Exceptional became commonplace,
and over the years the Court has recognized a large number of special
needs. If special needs are found, the Fourth Amendment warrant and
probable cause requirements are inapplicable. Instead, the finding
triggers a balancing of private and governmental interests, looking to
whether the search is reasonable. The special needs balancing invariably
results in upholding the governmental intrusion.23 In those cases in which
the government alleged special needs and lost, it lost not because of the
balancing; rather, the Court concluded that there was no special need.
The Justices would find either that the need was symbolic rather than
special,24 or that the immediate objective was merely to search for
evidence of criminal wrongdoing.25
20. See id. at 533.
21. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976) (upholding inventory
search of car without warrant or probable cause; the search yielded contraband drugs which was
used against the defendant car owner).
22. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (noting that "[a] state's operation
of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision
of a regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may
justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements") (footnote omitted); see
also Gerald S. Reamey, When "Special Needs" Meet Probable Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit of
Law, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 318-19 (1991) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court has created subclasses
of the population entitled to less constitutional protection than the rest. Probationers, automobile
salvage dealers, government workers, railway employees, certain customs agents, and school
children no longer enjoy the safeguards of probable cause and warrants.") (footnotes omitted).
23. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (allowing
preliminary questioning of motorists at checkpoints as a way of deterring drunk driving); New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-18 (1987) (upholding warrantless search of automobile junkyards by
police officer); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872-73 (upholding warrantless search of probationer's home on
less than probable cause); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 369 (1987) (affirming inventory
search of arrestee's backpack).
24. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997) (invalidating law requiring candidates
for high political office to submit to drug testing, finding governmental need "symbolic, not
'special"').
25. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001) (invalidating city hospital rule
transmitting positive drug test results of pregnant women to police for prosecution, finding that the
immediate need was not protection of pregnant women and fetuses, but rather the gathering of
information for prosecution).
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Indeed, one of the difficulties of the special needs cases is that the
result seems to depend on the answer to the front-end question-is there
a special need? If the need is viewed as special, which it usually is, the
balancing always tilts toward the government. Conceptually, it appears
in these cases that the governmental interest is counted twice-once to
determine if the need is special, and then again in the balancing of
governmental and private interests. The double dipping must result in a
governmental win unless the search is extremely intrusive.26
Interestingly, the Court refuses to do any balancing of interests if
probable cause exists, except in "extraordinary" cases, such as seizures
accomplished by deadly force27 or an unannounced entry into a home.28
Thus, if the police have probable cause, and they have not acted
barbarously, the Court generally will not balance to provide extra Fourth
Amendment protection. 29 Thus, balancing almost always yields less, not
more.
There are no fixed or objective criteria to determine when a need is
special. If the Court believes that the need is substantial or important and
is independent of law enforcement goals, then the need is deemed
special. The special need inquiry is the converse of the substantive due
process analysis to determine if a non-textual right is fundamental. If the
right is fundamental, the Court uses a strict scrutiny compelling state
interest-necessary means test, and the result is almost always in favor of
the individual right.30 The real analysis, however, is in deciding if the
right is fundamental, and the Court has not clarified why a particular

26. Cf Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (reversing court ordered surgery on defendant to
obtain bullet as evidence; the Court weighed and balanced private and governmental interests and
concluded that the state had not shown a compelling need for the bullet and that the operation could
result in harm to the defendant).
27. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
28. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
29. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (authorizing pretextual stops
for traffic violations). The petitioners, citing the extraordinary amount of discretion placed in police
hands, asked the Court to balance the private and governmental interests. But, said Justice Scalia,
the Court only balances when there is probable cause if the search or seizure is conducted in an
extraordinary way or where it is harmful to a person's privacy or physical interest, citing Winston.
See id. at 818.
30. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing
a fundamental right to die, but allowing state to regulate the decision); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978) (although an equal protection case, the Court was using the fundamental rights
strand of equal protection which is the same as the substantive due process inquiry; Court found
right to marry a fundamental right); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (the choice of family members to live together is a special right requiring intense scrutiny
of government ordinance denying them that right); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding
woman has a privacy right to an abortion in the early stages of her pregnancy).
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right is fundamental. 3' The Court announces results rather than providing
reasons. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have moved away from
finding fundamental rights because of the fluidity and subjectivity of the
inquiry, which, if positive, usually results in the law being struck down,
and because it smells like the disavowed Lochnerizing-ends scrutiny.32 In
special needs cases, on the other hand, the laws are almost always
upheld. As a result, the special needs exception is in danger of
swallowing the Fourth Amendment, which, it must be remembered,
embodies an explicit constitutional right protected by the warrant and
probable cause requirements.
The analysis in special needs cases has evolved into a simplistic
schema: a once over lightly, special needs inquiry-balancing with a
thumb on the government's side. Surprise, government wins.
Interestingly, in those few cases where the Court finds no special need,
the analysis of that issue tends to be much more refined.33 The Court will
look at many factors and for evidence that a warrant or probable cause
would impede the state's ability to carry out an important non-criminal
objective that is based in reality.
With rising drug use and violence in the schools, it did not take
school officials long to test the limits of T.L.O. In Vernonia School
District v. Acton,35 the United States Supreme Court rejected Fourth
Amendment claims and upheld a public school district's policy

31. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state law criminalizing
homosexual sodomy). The majority noted the two tests for determining whether a right is
fundamental-liberties deeply rooted in the nation's history, and whether the right is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, summarily concluding that homosexual sodomy did not fit either
standard, nor did it resemble prior cases finding fundamental fights in childbearing and rearing,
marriage, and contraception. See id. 190-92. The dissent viewed the implicated right as "the right to
be let alone." See id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)
(plurality opinion). Justice Scalia argued that when determining if a right is fundamental one looks
to the historic tradition that is at the most specific level of generality. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at
122. Even the Justices joining Justice Scalia's opinion specifically disassociated themselves from
the above view. See id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
32. See, e.g., San Antonio ISD v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). An equal protection case in
which the Court refused to find that the right to education was a fundamental right requiring strict
scrutiny. See id. at 37. Whether a right is fundamental, said the Court, is not the importance of the
right but "whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution." Id. at 33-34; see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195 (noting that there was a "great resistance to
expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental").
33. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
34. See id. at 314-15.
35. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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permitting random urinalysis drug testing36 of both grade school and
high school students who voluntarily participated in interscholastic
athletic programs.37 Earlier decisions upheld random urinalysis in other
special needs contexts. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,"
the Court found that random testing of railroad personnel who were
involved in serious train accidents or who violated safety regulations
was constitutional because of the high incidence of drug use among
railway employees and the danger to railroad passengers.39 However, in
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab," urinalysis of federal
customs officials who carry weapons or who are involved in drug
interdiction was upheld by the Court because of the risk of harm to the
populace, even though there was no evidence of drug use by such
officers. 4' Thus, in these cases, the government had asserted a special
need, and presented evidence either that drug use was a problem in the
particular context,42 or that the danger to the public was acute. 3 Where
neither factor was present, the .Court denied special needs status,"4 thus
obviating the balancing test.45
In Acton, the school district introduced evidence of heavy drug use
and increasing disciplinary problems 6 The schools had targeted athletes
because of the increased danger of physical injuries to them,47 and
because they were role models for the student body. 48 The combined role

36. Government mandated taking of urine for drug analysis is a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
37. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 663.
38. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
39. See id. at 629-31. One might even argue that the testing in Skinner was not really random.
The requirements of a serious accident or violation of safety regulations might be viewed as
providing reasonable suspicion, or at least, seriously limiting the number of persons subject to the
testing.
40. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
41. See id. at 664.
42. In Skinner, the government produced evidence that there was prevalent drug use among
railway employees. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607.
43. In Von Raab, there was no evidence that customs officials used drugs, but the danger to
the public that could arise because of drugged officers carrying weapons was deemed sufficient to
constitute a special need. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666. Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the
need was merely symbolic of the war on drugs. See id. at 686 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
45. Nonetheless, in Chandler, even though the majority declined to assign special need status
to the law requiring candidates for high office to take a drug test, it went on to note "that the testing
method the Georgia statute describes is relatively noninvasive; therefore, if the 'special needs'
showing had been made, the State could not be faulted for excessive intrusion." Id. at 318.
46. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995).
47. See id. at 649.
48. See id. at 648.
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model influence and physical danger gave the governmental interest
greater oomph.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion, however, could be read to grant
schools even greater power, one not dependent on the role model status
of targeted students or the possibility of physical injury. When Justice
Scalia discussed the privacy right at stake he noted that "[c]entral, in our
view, to the present case is the fact that the subjects of the [drug testing]
Policy are (1) children, who (2) have been committed to the temporary
custody of the State as schoolmaster."49 Again, at the end of his opinion,
Justice Scalia noted that "the most significant element" in upholding the
policy was the parens patriae interest of the schools, as "guardian and
tutor of children entrusted to its care."50 In addition, the majority
appeared to lower the standard for determining the strength of the
government interest from compelling to important, and also seemed to
lessen the stringency of the means analysis.5' At the beginning of the
opinion, Justice Scalia emphasized the general drug and disciplinary
problems at the school, thus focusing on the entire student body.52 In the
concluding part of the opinion, however, he finally focused on the
athletes, their role model affect and susceptibility to injury.5 3 Thus the
ends and means did not require a very tight fit. Acton rejected an
individualized suspicion test even though it would limit the number of
students, most of whom are innocent, subjected to testing. In fact, the
Court was enamored of the random testing, because it did not single out
students for stigmatization.
Did Acton mean that schools could show special needs in the
abstract, that is, as a national problem which all schools could address
regardless of the incidence of drug use in their schools, or more
narrowly, did special needs arise because of the drug and discipline
problems in the particular school? Assuming the latter, what standard of
proof would be sufficient to show special need? Furthermore, could a
school reach beyond its interest in preventing injuries and blunting the
role model affect to reach students engaged in extracurricular activities
or even all students?
Justice Scalia's opinion in Acton seems to find special needs simply
because a school was involved. After describing how special needs
could make the warrant and probable cause requirements
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 654.
Id. at 665.
See id. at 660-61.
See id. at 648-49.
See id. at 663.
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"impracticable," without further ado he states, "[w]e have found such
'special needs' to exist in the public school context. 54 This suggests a
broad reading of special needs, which merely requires that a school be
involved. That conclusory statement, however, followed a long
recitation of the drug and disciplinary problems in the particular schools.
This suggests that the special needs doctrine could not be invoked unless
the school demonstrates special needs by showing significant drug use
among its students. Or, was the special need evidence relevant only to
the strength of the governmental interest, that is, in the balancing of
private and governmental interests? In this connection, Justice
O'Connor, dissenting in Acton, argued that even if suspicionless drug
testing were justified, on the facts of the Acton case, the testing was
unreasonable because there was "virtually no evidence in the record of a
drug problem" at the grade school.5
In Board of Education v. Earls,5 6 the Court, 5-4,57 upheld a policy
requiring drug testing of students who wanted to participate in any
extracurricular activities (but in practice applied only to competitive
extracurricular programs). 8 These activities included the National Honor
Society, the Academic team, Future Farmers of America, band, choir,
Future Homemakers of America, cheerleading and athletics. The drug
testing policy mandated a urine test before participating in the activity,
and student agreement to drug testing at any time thereafter based on
reasonable suspicion.
Justice Thomas immediately honed in on Acton's "the schools'
custodial and tutelary responsibility for children" language as a basis for
dispensing with individualized suspicion when testing school children
for drugs-"' special needs' inhere in the public school context." 9
Interestingly, this view was shared by Justice Ginsburg in dissent.
However, even though she thought it was a special needs case, she
concluded that the search was unreasonable, noting that the policy

54. Id. at 653.
55. Id. at 684 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
56. 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002).
57. Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Breyer joined. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate concurring
opinion. Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she was joined by Justice Souter.
Justice Ginsburg also filed a dissenting opinion, in which she was joined by Justices Stevens,
O'Connor and Souter.
58. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2569.
59. Id. at 2561, 2564.
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"targets for testing a student population least likely to be at risk from
illicit drugs and their damaging effects." 6
The perfunctory special needs finding led to the balancing of
interests rather than application of the warrant and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. As in Acton, this custodial and
tutelary responsibility plays a large part in the balancing. Looking first
to the students' privacy interests, the Court noted that they are "limited
in a public school environment" because children are required to
undergo physical examinations and vaccinations. 6 The plaintiffs argued
that they had a greater expectation of privacy than athletes because they
did not have "regular physicals and communal undress, 62 a fact stressed
by the Acton majority. Justice Thomas, however, found that such factors
were not "essential" to the Acton Court's decision, which he claimed,
"depended primarily upon the school's custodial responsibility and
authority."63 But, Justice Thomas asserted, "students who participate in
competitive extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to
many of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes," pointing to
"off-campus
travel
and communal undress." 64 Furthermore,
extracurricular activities are regulated and this further diminishes the
expectation of privacy. Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, countered that many
students are "modest and shy," and that extracurricular activities only
occasionally required out of town travel during which times the
bathroom facilities provided were usually enclosed stalls.65 More to the
point, she stressed that "[p]articipation in such activities is a key
component of school life, essential in reality for students applying to
college, and, for all participants, a significant contributor to the breadth
and quality of the educational experience. 66
The majority also minimized the nature of the intrusion, as it did in
Acton. In fact, in the case at bar, male students could produce urine
samples behind a closed-door stall,67 whereas in Acton only females had

60. Id. at 2572 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor joined Justice Ginsburg's
dissenting opinion. In a separate one paragraph dissent joined by Justice Souter, Justice O'Connor
noted that she still thought Acton was wrongly decided, but "[b]ecause [Acton] is now this Court's
precedent, and because I agree that petitioners' program fails even under the balancing approach
adopted in that case, I join Justice Ginsburg's dissent." Id. at 2571 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 2565.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2565-66.
65. See id. at 2574 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2573 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 2566.
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that privilege.68 Since Acton's collection practice was deemed
"negligible," the method used in Earls was "even less problematic."'6 9
Justice Breyer, concurring, noted that "not everyone would agree with
this Court's characterization of ... urine sampling as 'negligible.' 70
In assessing the privacy interest, Justice Thomas stressed that the
test results were not shared with police officials.' The only consequence
of three positive reactions was suspension from the extracurricular
activities.72 This latter factor appealed to Justice Breyer because it gave a
"conscientious objector" a way out.73 He acknowledged that the price
paid for this option was "serious, but less severe than expulsion from the
school. 74

Finally, Justice Thomas looked to the "nature and immediacy" of
the government's concern and the efficacy of the policy in meeting
them-a means-ends analysis.75 Unlike Acton, there was very little
evidence of a significant drug problem in the district's schools. No
matter, said the majority-"the nationwide drug epidemic makes the war
against drugs a pressing concern in every school." 76 But in any event

there was specific evidence of drug use, which, said Justice Thomas, was
"sufficient ... to shore up the need for its drug testing program., 77 He
added, however, that proof of a drug problem was not necessary to the
government's power to require drug testing."8 He concluded that "[g]iven
the nationwide epidemic of drug use, and the evidence of increased drug
use in Tecumseh schools," the school district's policy was reasonable.79
Justice Thomas rejected outright the Tenth Circuit's more stringent
means-end test that such drug testing could be sustained only if the
school showed that there was "some identifiable drug abuse problem
among a sufficient number of those subject to the testing, such that
testing that group of students will actually redress its drug problem. 8
This reasoning resonated with the Court's opinion in Chandler, which

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).
Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2566.
Id. at 2570-71 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id. at 2567.
See id.
See id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).
ld.
See id. at 2567.
Id.
Id. at 2568.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 2567-68 (quoting Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1278 (10th Cir. 2001)).
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found no special need because there was no evidence that there was a
drug abuse problem among Georgia officials."'
In Acton, the Court had emphasized the safety concerns relating to
athletes. The plaintiffs in Earls stressed this point, but to no avail8 2
Safety is a concern for all children, not just athletes. Individualized
suspicion was not necessary because it would be too heavy a burden for
teachers and because of the possibility that unpopular groups could be
targeted, which would increase the fear of lawsuits-an echo of Justice
Scalia's argument in Acton."' The Earls majority conceded that there was
a closer fit between means and ends in Acton, but "such a finding was
not essential to the holding. 84
Justice Breyer, although writing his own opinion, concurred in
Justice Thomas's opinion. He cited statistics showing significant drug
use among children, the government's failure to reduce usage and the
school's responsibility to provide a safe learning environment. 8' He
argued that if schools were unsafe, parents would send their children to
religious or private schools, a possibility facilitated by the Court's
determination that vouchers for religious schools did not violate the First
Amendment.86 Finally, Justice Breyer was persuaded because the school
board had open meetings about the policy and there was little objection
from the community.87 This factor also played a role in Acton.8 In effect,
this reasoning gives the majority the power to define the Fourth
Amendment, a fundamental right purportedly not subject to majoritarian
manipulation.
Justice Ginsburg in dissent argued forcefully that athletes presented
different problems than students who participate in non-physical
extracurricular activities." Although it is possible that tuba players in the
band might collide because they took drugs, "the great majority of
students the School District seeks to test in truth are engaged in activities
that are not safety sensitive to an unusual degree. There is a difference

81. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997) ("Georgia asserts no evidence of a drug
problem among the State's elected officials.").
82. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2568.
83. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663-64 (1995).
84. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2569.
85. See id. at 2570 (Breyer, J., concurring).
86. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2473 (2002). Presumably, however, that
same ruling would permit parents who do not want the public schools to require random urinalysis
of their children to take their voucher money to private schools that do not resort to such tactics.
87. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).
88. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 665.
89. See Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2573 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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between imperfect tailoring and no tailoring at all."9° The irony she noted
was that "students who participate in extracurricular activities are
significantly less likely to develop substance abuse problems than are
their less-involved peers." 9 Justice Ginsburg concluded that if the
school's policy was aimed at deterrence, it was doubly irrational. It
targets students who generally do not need deterrence and excludes
students who are more likely to have drug problems from the very
activities that might help them.92

Parsing court opinions is the core concern of law school and the
law. We teach students to read both broadly (what is the overarching
driving policy concern of the court), and narrowly (what is absolutely
essential to the holding), in order to ascertain the extent of the court's
ruling and the direction in which it may be going.
Elsewhere, I have analyzed the breadth of Justice Scalia's opinion
in Acton, 93 and therefore the Earls decision was not surprising to me, or,
I suspect, to many others. The scope and weakness of the majority's
opinion in Earls, however, was somewhat more than I expected. First,
that special safety concerns relating to the target group is largely
irrelevant. The health of all children seems to be what is important, no
matter how unstrenuous the activities in which they engage.
Quarterbacks and chess club members are equal in that regard and if so,
it'is no small leap from that to all students, whether involved in
extracurricular activities or not. After all, students could be injured
during gym class or while running past each other in the halls. Justice
Breyer concurring, however, voiced approval of the policy because it
"avoids subjecting the entire school to testing. 9 4 Justice Ginsburg
argued in dissent in Earls that
[Acton] cannot be read to endorse invasive and suspicionless drug
testing of all students upon any evidence of drug use, solely because
drugs jeopardize the life and health of those who use them .... Had

the [Acton] Court agreed that public school attendance, in and of itself,
permitted the State to test each student's blood or urine for drugs, the
opinion in [Acton] could have saved many words. 95

90. Id. at 2577 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. See Irene Merker Rosenberg, Public School Drug Testing: The Impact of Acton, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 349 (1995).
94. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 2572-73 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Given the Court's enthrallment with the custodial and tutelary
responsibility of the schools as a basis for constricting constitutional
protection, such a broad regulation is not beyond the pale. This is not to
say, however, that all drug testing of students or drug testing of all
students would necessarily be upheld. As noted above, Justice Breyer
emphasized
-that the policy "avoids subjecting the entire school to
96
testing.,
Furthermore, Justice Thomas stressed that the information yielded
by the test was not turned over to the police.97 Presumably, therefore,
sharing such information with the authorities might be problematic. But
not all such cooperation is invalid in special needs cases. In Griffin v.
Wisconsin," evidence obtained from a probationer's home without a
warrant or probable cause was used in evidence to convict the
defendant, 99 and in New York v. Burger,'m evidence taken from a car
dealer's lot without a warrant or probable cause was used to convict the
lot owner of a crime.' °' The Court noted in Burger that government may
attack a problem by both criminal and regulatory means.' 2 By extension,
arguably a school district may attempt to curb drug use among students
by denying access to extracurricular activities, suspension from school,
or by criminal prosecution.
On the other hand, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,°3 the Court
overturned a conviction of a pregnant woman whose urine test the public
hospital turned over to the police for prosecution. '°0 The hospital policy
authorized such cooperation with the police to force pregnant women
whose urine tests showed drug use into drug treatment programs or risk
jail. The Court was uneasy about the cozy cooperation between police
and hospital. Of course, Ferguson involved adult women. Furthermore,
Ferguson is technically not a special needs case. The Court found that
the government's special objective, i.e., protecting the health of the
woman and fetus, were not the immediate need but rather the ultimate
goal. O5 The immediate objective was to gather evidence for the police

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id. at 2566.
483 U.S. 868 (1987).
See id. at 872.
482 U.S. 691 (1987).
See id. at 693.
See id. at 700.
532 U.S. 67 (2001).
See id. at 69-70, 86.
See id. at 82-84.
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and therefore was subject to normal Fourth Amendment constraints. ' 06
The immediate/ultimate objective was a new distinction in special needs
cases, one that Justice Kennedy pooh-pooed.' 7 He argued in his
concurrence in Ferguson that in every special needs case the search
yielded evidence of criminal activity, which was then used to convict.' °8
The use of such evidence in no way took the search out of the special
needs category, if indeed it was a special need. He opined that such a
distinction was of little use and ephemeral."°
The immediate/ultimate distinction may have been invented to deal
with the hand in glove cooperation of hospital and police personnel,
which was used as a bludgeon against pregnant women. But clearly,
under prior case law, such cooperation should not have been
constitutionally determinative. "° The Court could perhaps have achieved
the same result by arguing that the means were not sufficiently related to
the objective of protecting the health of mother and child. Amici, the
American Medical Association and the American Public Health
Association, argued that such a hospital policy would drive women, who
were poor, not to seek prenatal care, thus increasing risk to both."' That
analysis might, however, be used to strengthen the means-end analysis
in other cases. The Court apparently thought that the special needs
distinction could be more easily contained. In any event, Ferguson is not
a special needs case and deals with~adult women. Therefore its ruling
might not be applicable to public school students who are minors, whose
constitutional rights are diluted, and who learn in a public school which
does implicate a special need.
In T.L.O., the marijuana the administrator found was in fact turned
over to the police and was used to convict her of delinquency in juvenile
court.' 2 Because the Court found that the search was constitutional, the
majority did not need to reach the issue of whether illegally obtained
evidence from a student was admissible." 3 Indeed, the Court has never
determined whether the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment
applies to school searches, thus barring illegally obtained evidence in
106. See id. at 84.
107. See id. at 86-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
108. See id. at 87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109. See id. at 87-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 717-18 (1987).
111. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 n.23.
112. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 330 (1985).
113. In T.L.O., the Court had initially granted certiorari on only the exclusionary rule issue.
After briefing and oral argument, a majority ordered the parties to brief and argue the substantive
issue of whether the search itself was constitutional. See id. at 327-28.
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juvenile or adult criminal court."' Furthermore, the Court may never
have to reach the exclusionary rule issue because its rulings are
substantively constricting the Fourth Amendment. What Earls does is to
expand the category of permissible searches in schools.
Since Justice Breyer was the fifth vote in Earls, it is important to
focus on the factors that might influence him to invalidate certain drug
testing programs in the public schools. While it is true that he joined the
majority opinion, he wrote a concurring opinion to "emphasize several
underlying considerations,"
which, in his view, were "consistent with
5
1
opinion."
the Court's
Justice Breyer liked the policy because he thought it would
discourage drug use. Peer pressure, he noted, was the "single most
important factor leading school children to take drugs."'16 He saw the
extracurricular activities as providing an excuse which would allow
students to refuse to take drugs without fear of stigmatization by his or
her drug-taking friends. In this way, the school environment would be
changed. Also important to Justice Breyer is that the penalty for refusing
to give urine samples or for those testing positive was merely
nonparticipation in the extracurricular activities, which he thought was
not as onerous as expulsion from school.
Justice Breyer opined that individualized suspicion might lead
schools to "push the boundaries of 'individualized suspicion' to its outer
limits"" 7 and might result in the use of "subjective criteria" that would
more heavily impact on "unpopular groups," and "leave those whose
behavior is slightly abnormal stigmatized in the minds of others.""' 8
Because of these dangers, he concluded that the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness requirement "will further that Amendment's libertyprotecting objectives at least to the same extent as application of the
mediating 'individualized suspicion' test, where, as here, the testing
program is neither criminal nor disciplinary in nature."'' 9
Thus, Justice Breyer is not committed to upholding urine testing of
all students, nor to programs in which the penalty for refusal is punished
114. See generally Irene Merker Rosenberg, A Door Left Open: Applicability of the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule to Juvenile Court Delinquency Hearings, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 29
(1996) (arguing that the Court, if faced with the question, would hold that the exclusionary rule is
not applicable to delinquency cases as a matter of federal law, particularly regarding searches by
school officials).
115. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 122 U.S. 2559, 2569 (2002).
116. Id. at 2570.
117. Id. at 2571.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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either by criminal sanctions or disciplinary actions by the school.
Moreover, as noted above, to Justice Breyer the "democratic,
participatory process" that resulted in no opposition to the policy, is an
important factor in the reasonableness of the program.120
The danger of Earls is that it is a precedent that permits an invasive
drug testing program that overcomes the privacy rights of children, even
though it does not substantially relate to the problem at hand. The
means-end fit in Earls resembles the way the Court analyzes Equal
Protection challenges to social and economic programs. If a fundamental
right or suspect classification is not involved, and usually they are not in
such types of legislation, the Court uses a low-level rational relationship
in the
test that turns out to be no test. If the ends and means are remotely
upheld. 21
is
legislation
the
ballparks,
adjacent
even
or
same
From time to time, however, the Court, although reluctant to find
more suspect classifications or fundamental rights, because the strict
scrutiny it triggers is usually "fatal in fact, ' ' 122 occasionally subjects some
economic and social legislation which impacts on an "important"
interest or on a disfavored class to a more stringent form of rational
relationship analysis. For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc.,23 the Court refused to find retarded persons a
suspect or quasi-suspect class or that the right to housing was a
fundamental right, either of which would trigger heightened scrutiny.' 24
At the same time, supposedly using only low-level rational relationship
scrutiny,125 the Court invalidated a zoning order refusing a permit for a
group home for retarded persons.'26 In fact, the Court was subjecting the
zoning ordinance to a more rigorous analysis, one which Justice
Marshall calls "heightened scrutiny ' ' 27 and which Gerald Gunther terms
rational relationship with "bite.' 28

120. See id.
121. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (upholding federal
benefits law under a rational relationship standard, and noting that if there is any plausible reasons
for Congress' action, the Court's inquiry is over); see Gunther, supra note 5, at 8 (noting that the
deferential old equal protection required "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact").
122. See Gunther, supra note 5,at 8.
123. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
124. See id. at 442.
125. "To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally
retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." Id. at 446.
126. See id. at 447-50.
127. Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128. See Gunther, supra note 5, at 22.
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Similarly, in Plyler v. Doe,'29 although the right to education is not a
fundamental right, and undocumented children are not a suspect class,
the Court, citing the need for "special constitutional sensitivity,"' 3 struck
down a Texas law prohibiting such children from receiving a free public
school education. 3' The majority looked to the importance of education,
seeing it as a way of preventing a permanent underclass.'32 Justice
Brennan argued that the law "imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete
class of children not accountable for their disabling status,"'33 and that in
looking to its rationality the Court "may appropriately take into account
its costs to the Nation and to. the innocent children who are its
victims.' 3 4 This more rigorous kind of analysis, which, while still
deferential, assures that the government proposal is actually designed to
meet the stated problem without overkill.
The public schools in this country perform vital functionsimparting knowledge, developing analytical skills, instilling the
democratic values of our constitutional system, and nurturing special
talents by offering special courses and extracurricular activities. The
latter in particular provide a broad range of educational opportunities.
Conditioning access to these programs by forcing students to consent to
searches is not a lesson the schools should be teaching. The schools can
accomplish their objectives more directly and effectively by the use of
particularized suspicion. Students are under constant observation by
teachers, administrators and other students, and that scrutiny will
facilitate spotting drug users, certainly far more so than random testing.
The Court and Justice Breyer made oblique references to the
possibility of racism or other kinds of discrimination if individualized
suspicion were required. That is perverse reasoning. Complaints are
sometimes made that adult minorities are singled out more often by the
police than white persons. We do not on that account suspend the need
for probable cause and allow random searching. Indeed, perhaps such
discrimination can best be met by insisting on particularized suspicion,
because it forces the police to articulate specific non-racial factors about
the suspect. Of course, we must also try to make sure that equal
protection is obeyed, both on the streets and in our schools.
Interestingly, the federal courts generally will not entertain section 1983

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Id. at 226.
See id. at 230.
See id.
at 226.
Id. at 223.
Id.at 224.
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actions based on students' allegations that they were subjected to
arbitrary and excessive corporal punishment in violation of due
process."' If, however, the student complains that the beatings were
inflicted because of race, the courts will examine the claim under the
Equal Protection Clause.'36 In fact, in Whren v. United States,'37 it was
argued that allowing police officers to make pretextual stops when
drivers committed minor traffic infractions would impact adversely on
racial minorities. The Court's curt response was to direct the petitioners'
attention to the availability of the Equal Protection Clause,'38 even
though equal protection is not an adequate substitute for Fourth
Amendment protection because it requires proof of intent, which is hard
to establish. 3 9
Justice Breyer was also concerned that requiring individualized
suspicion would result in pushing that test to its limits and beyond. Why
any more so than with adults? Either there is or there is not sufficient
information to establish the requisite level of suspicion. Furthermore, the4 0
Court itself has been the one pushing the tests for both probable cause1
and reasonable suspicion to low levels. 4' Does that mean we must
abandon such tests and allow random testing of everyone? The remedy
for these possibilities lies with insisting that the test for particularized
suspicion be maintained. Indeed, one might argue that since enforcement
officials tend to dilute the Court's rulings, 42 to assure appropriate
protection, the Court should make its standards stricter.
The reach of Earls will undoubtedly soon be determined. After
T.L.O., Acton, and Earls, I have no doubt that there is some school
administrator somewhere who will decide to require all students to
undergo urinalysis as a condition to school attendance. It is also likely
that parents will applaud the idea because it shifts the burden of conflict
between them and their children to the schools.
135. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1067 (1989). Some courts will do so if malice and inhumane abuse is shown. See e.g., Hall v.
Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
136. See, e.g., Coleman v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., 702 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
137. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
138. Seeid. at813.
139. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (holding that disparate impact is
insufficient to establish a violation of equal protection).
140. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-32 (1983) (lowering the standard for determining
probable cause).
141. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000) (holding flight from police officers
in heavy narcotics trafficking area is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion).
142. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 785, 792 (1970) (making this argument).
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Notwithstanding their purported non-criminal objectives, our
schools are becoming fortresses of police power without adequate
constitutional controls, engaging in drug testing, strip searches, dogs
patrolling the halls and classrooms, and corporal punishment. Is there
any time for education in them?
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